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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J. SEAL,
-vs.-

Plaintiff and Respondent,

CARPETS, INCORPORATED,
a Utah Corporation,

Case
No.10333

Defendant and .Appellant.

BRIEF O,F APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
In the lower Court, this action was brought by plaintiff to recover on an open account assigned to plaintiff
for collection by a Colorado corporation, doing business
as G. & P. Distributing Company, in the amount of
$5,493.05 plus interest. (R-1) Defendant admitted the
account and by way of affirmative defense alleged that
the goods and merchandise giving rise to the open account
furnished by plaintiff's assignor were defective; and by
reason of said defects, defendant was damaged in excess of plaintiff's claim. (R-2 and R-3) In its Answer,
def en<lant specifically alleged damage additionally to its
business reputation from loss of good will, etc.
1

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
The matter was tried before the Court without jury,
Judge Stewart M. Hanson presiding, on February 2,
1965. The Court rendered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of the plaintiff on
its undisputed claim and allowed an offset to the defendant in the amount of $1,625.00. (R-6, R-7)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, subsequent to the trial, moved the Court
to amend its Findings and further moved for a New
Trial. Said motions were made pursuant to stipulation
of counsel and leave granted by the Court, orally rather
than in writing, and argued February 19, 1965. Said motions were denied by the Court. (R-136) During the
course of the trial, defendant sought to introduce particular evidence relating to damages which, upon objection by plaintiff's counsel, was excluded by the Court.
From the judgment of the Court, the denial of the motions
above noted and for other errors which defendant maintains were committed during the trial, defendant appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime in October or November of 1962, plaintiff's
assignor, G. & P. Distributing Company (hereafter referred to as G. & P.) through a sales representative,
one Don Liston, made contact with Mr. William Thompson, secretary and salesman of defendant corporation,
2

for the purpose of selling to defendant carpeting. (R-16
and R-109) Liston had with him samples and other adyertising paraphernalia and quoted prices to Thompson
at the time, leaving some of the samples with him. (R-17
and R-18) Defendant was, at the time, bidding and attempting to retail carpeting to a United Homes, Incorporated, which company was constructing 36 apartments in
a series of six buildings located on 33rd South and approximately 21st East in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R-17-19)
Defendant furnished said United Homes with a bid on
the apartment job based upon the prices quoted by Liston and furnished United Homes with samples supplied
hy Liston. (R-18) United Homes contracted to purchase approximately 2200 yards of said carpeting; and
defendant, in turn, ordered the same from G. & P. The
order was placed ·with G. & P. sometime in early NovemhPr of 1962. (R-43 and R-44)
William Thompson testified that attached to the samples later delivered to United Homes was a printed warranty, warranting the carpet against defective workmanship and wear for a period of five years, with the
exception of stairways. (R-20-22) The witness further
indicated his efforts to reobtain from United Homes the
samples with the warranty attached, which he testified
he had attempted to get up to and including the day before the trial vvithout success. (R-21) The existence of
the warranty and its terms were corroborated by Mr.
Claude Thompson, president of defendant corporation
(and, incidentally, father of William C. Thompson, the
previous witness). (R-88)
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Mr. V. B. Witherell, President of G. & P., denied
the existence of any such warranty categorically. (R-112)
On cross-examination, Witherell admitted, however, that
he had no direct knowledge as to what warranty his salesman, Liston, had made nor what written warranty, if any,
was attached to the samples furnished by Liston to defendant. (R-112-113) On further cross-examination, he
admitted that without a written guarantee that ''all mills
guarantee satisfaction in workmanship and materials,
but no written guarantee certificate." (R-115) He was
then asked if such guarantee related to the manufacture
of the carpet furnished United Homes and he answered
in the affirmative. Witherell, incidentally, further admitted
that the salesman, Liston, was in his employ a matter of
four months, leaving G. & P. sometime in December of
1962. (R-109-110)
Following the placement of the order for the carpet,
it was delivered sporadically in varying and assorted
roll sizes to defendant, beginning in November and continuing through January 20, 1963. (R-23) The rolls varied in length from 30 feet to 140 feet; and the witness,
William Thompson, indicated which rolls and what
lengths arrived in which months. (R-26-29, See also Exhibit D-6) Said deliveries occasioned difficulty between
defendant and its purchaser noted by Exhibits D-4 and
D-5. (R-30-31)
William Thompson was asked if he encountered difficulties with United by virtue of the sporadic deliveries,
and the court interpolated the question "delays you
4

mean.'' There was then a discussion by counsel with
the court thereafter concerning the admissibility of
evidence relative to loss of time from delay and damages
therefor to which plaintiff's counsel objected. The court
permitted defendant's counsel to make a proffer of proof
and then ordered that such an inquiry into such an area
was not permissible. The court did permit the introduction of said Exhibits D-4 and D-5 solely for their references to defects while refusing to consider the portions
of each which related to delay and damages resulting
therefrom.
The witness William Thompson further testified that
the defendant took a loss on the installation for United
Homes which he originally understood was $3,125.00, the
contract price being $13,125.00, and what he understood
the final settlement to be of $10,000.00. (R-33) On crossexamination, he was asked if the amount finally settled
with United Homes was $11,500.00 rather than $10,000.00,
and he indicated the record would have to be checked;
(R-38) at which point counsel for the defendant explained to the court that defendant had attempted to locate the settlement check from United Homes without
success and that it had not been obtained. Counsel for
plaintiff was, later during the trial, able to produce a
copy of the check in issue in the amount of $11,500.00
which was by stipulation received in evidence as Exhibit P-10. (R-50 and R-69)
The witness Claude Thompson testified about
the final settlement with United Homes and, as
5

part of said settlement, in addition to taking the loss,
whether a warranty was required to be furnished by him
to United Homes. His answers were that such a warranty was furnished of necessity and that it ran for a
period of three years. (R-52)
This witness was further asked about conversations
with -Witherell relative to the United Homes job and
complaints in connection with it. He was also asked
the particulars in which the carpet delivered differed
from the samples originally furnished and what defects he noted. His observations and testimony will be
cited in greater detail hereafter. This witness' testimony concerning his losses by virtue of the defective
material furnished will also be quoted at length subsequently.
Defendant called Kenneth P. Campman, the manager
of the apartment house, who testified in connection ·with
cleaning and maintenance of the carpeting and indicated
that approximately half the time the carpets in issue were
cleaned by him and the other half the time he contracted
to have it done professionally. (R-92) When asked about
his observations of the carpeting and its condition, he
indicated it was in some instances in fair condition but
in other instances in such poor condition as to make the
units with such carpeting difficult to rent. When asked
to be specific, he said:
''A. Rugs will sometime fray quite a bit. In
much carpet there is real little - kind of worn
bare, and in other cases it is just discolored. Yon
can work on it and work on it. I know a number
6

of the tenants who have complained about how
difficult they are to keep clean, and they just can't
keep them clean.'' ( 93)
Plaintiff called, on its behalf, Mr. V. B. Witherell,
known as Whitey Witherell. This witness asserted that,
while he had inspected the United Homes job only the
clay before the trial (R-10), he insisted there were no
defects in the carpet. (R-104) This opinion was based
upon an inspection of" six or seven apartments." (R-105)
This witness further admitted having notice of complaints relative to the quality of the carpet as early as
August of 1963 (R-98-R-99). He further acknowledged
receiving the formal notice of defects in a letter from
counsel for defendant (admitted in evidence as Exhibit
D-8) (R-117) which bears the date of October 22, 1963.
Accompanying Mr. Witherell on said inspection was
a Clifford Heaps, an employee of Service Master, Incorporated, which is a furniture and carpet cleaning
business. This Mr. Heaps, when called to testify, indicated that the units inspected were :five and six (R-121);
and he observed that some carpets had been "pilling or
fuzzing up." (R-122) He admitted that such pilling,
if the carpet was "continuous filament" nylon, would be
a defect. He then admitted that the carpet in issue
was "supposed to be continuous :filament" nylon. (R-128)
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in the following particulars :
(A) IN PREVENTING DEFENDAN'l1
FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE REGARD-
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ING DELAY IN DELIVERY AND IN PREVENTING EVIDENCE FROM BEING INTRODUCED TO SHOW DEFENDANT'S LOSS OF
BUSINESS AND FUTURE PROFITS.
(B) THE JUDGMEN'11 DID NOT CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED.
At the outset, defendant-appellant wishes to acknowledge that the trial court did apparently adopt defendant's position in granting an offset to it, and def endant-appellant has no quarrel with the court's conduct in
that connection but claims error in that the court below
did not consistently adopt defendant's full position; nor
did it go far enough in permitting and considering evidence of offset legitimately arising out of the facts of
this case.
(A) IN PREVENTING DEFENDANT
FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE REGARDING DELAY IN DELIVERY AND IN PREVENTING EVIDENCE FROM BEING INTRODUCED TO SHOW DEFENDANT'S LOSS OF
BUSINESS AND FUTURE PROFITS.
The witness, William Thompson, testified that at
the time the original order to G. & P. was made, a deadline of December 31 for delivery was imperative. The
questions and answers are as follows:
'' Q. And in that connection was there any discussion - was there any discussion "\vi th '11 om -

THE CouRT : ''Don.''
MR. MADSEN: ''Don.'' Excuse me. Thank you,
your Honor.
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Q. (By 1'1R. MADSEN) Relating to the time of
delivery, or the nature of this particular order1
A. It was specified in our bid we would be
completed approximately the 31st of December,
and he was pushing, trying to get his units completed so he could rent them. They are not making too much money when they are empty.
Q. Mr. Sorensen, you are referring to1
A. So this urgency was impressed upon Don,
that these rolls had to be here, and we would have
delivery of said-" (R. 24)

Then following his testimony of the extended period
of delivery running through January 20, with its accompanying difficulties. The record shows as follows:

"Q. Now, let me hand you what has been
marked- Did you encounter difficulties with your
customer by virtue of these deliveries?
THE CouRT : Delays, you mean?
MR. HANSEN: I am going to object to this as
being beyond the issues of this answer.
THE CouRT : You don't set this forth in your
answer.
MR. MADSEN: We will have to amend it. We
talk a bout our damages by virtue of the carpeting material, and if that isn't broad enough we
would like to include the manner in which it was
delivered, as well as the quality of the material.
THE CouRT: The rules provide you have to
do that within 5 days.
MR. MADSEN: I think it is probative, your
Honor. It goes to the total problem. Let me
make a proffer of proof, and then if you wish to
object9

MR. HANSEN: I would object to any proof
being made on that point.
THE CouRT: He is going to make the proffer at
this time.

1\iR. MADSEN: I point out, and referring to this
delivery matter, your Honor, it runs to the question of the difficulty that my clients subsequently
had in the matter of collections of their account,
and further the resulting damage of their being
unable to continue business on further installations
with this same customer. It relates indirectly to
the total product furnished. It is a matter of
when as well as what.
The letters I was about to introduce relate both
to the quality of the carpet, as well as to the matters of the delays of installation, and we are pointing out the fact that the delay ·was in large measure the plaintiff's assignor's responsibility and
problem, that totally and accumulatively vrns involved in the loss that we sustained in the matter,
and indirectly the present problem and loss that
we are now facing yet, and we claim a loss.
We refer then generally to the word "defective" in our pleading. If that isn't broad enough
in our pleading we would like leave to amend. I
don't believe it is a matter of surprise or notice.
The facts are as certainly in the plaintiff's knovvledge as ours.
MR. HANSEN: It is certainly a matter of surprise, your Honor. We came to defend on one
proposition.
10

THE CouRT: The Pretrial Order limits it to
that. I will accept your proffer and sustain his
objection.
MR. MADSEN : We will introduce most of these
exhibits for the limited field of the quality in the
carpet.
THE CouRT: I will receive the matter of delivery over Mr. Hansen's objection, so if you decide to appeal the record will be complete.
MR. MADSEN: Thank you, your Honor.
Q. (By MR. MADSEN) Mr. Thompson, do you,
in the course of your business, supervise the correspondence and the other related documents you
receive, in the course of your business~
A. The majority of them, yes.
Q. I hand you what has been marked "Exhib-

it 4."

THE CouRT : "Exhibit D-4."
(The document referred to was marked, "Exhibit D-4," for identification.)
Q. (By MB. MADSEN) And ask you if in fact
the original letter was received in your office~
A. Yes, it was.

1\1R. MADSEN : Counsel, this is a carbon, but if
you would, to take the carbon given to me rather
than the original received by my client, and if we
can put it in with this witness, I would rather
do so.
1\fa. HANSEN : Why don't you just furnish the
original~

1\b. MADSEN: We have tried to locate the original at the defendant's place of business ·without
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success. If we find the original we will insert it
in place of the carbon.
MR. HANSEN: He has testified he received the
original of this?
MR. 1\1ADSEN : Yes.

1\fR. HANSEN: But it isn't the original of this?
l\b. MADSEN : Yes.

MR. HANSEN: No objection.
MR. MADSEN : Thank you.
THE CouRT: It will be received.
(The document, previously marked ''Exhibit

D-4," for identification, was received in evidence.)

MR. HANSEN: This is, of course, subject to the
objection we made on it?
THE CouRT : Yes.
Q. (By MR. MADSEN) I hand you document
D-5, and ask you if that was received in the course

of business?

(The document ref erred to was marked ''Exhibit D-5,'' for identification.)

A. Yes, it was.
MR. HANSEN: We make the same objection,
it is not within the issues, your Honor.
THE CouRT: Subject to that objection it will
be received for the purpose of making the record
complete.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit D-5,'' for identification was received in evidence.)" (R-28-R-31.)
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Exhibits D-4 and D-5, therefore, were admitted solely
for the purpose of making the record complete, rather
than running to the issue of delay and damages therefrom. This court will note that Exhibit D-4 (a letter
from United Homes' attorney, David West) in its first
paragraph cancels United's order for the carpeting in issue and points out in the second paragraph that such
cancellation is because of delay in delivery. Exhibit
D-5, also, in its first two paragraphs concerns itself with
delay and the second sentence of the third paragraph
alone refers to quality in the following language: ''Also,
you have not put the same quality carpet in the apartments that you showed me.'' Clearly, defendant's customer, as well as the defendant, were concerned as much
·with time of delivery as with the quality of the carpet;
mid both were subsequently alleged in defendant's answer herein (R-2 and R-3) and speci:fially therein the
defendant alleged loss of future business and good will
of the customer. The witness William Thompson was
later asked if his company had done any subsequent
business with United Homes as follows:
'' Q. Have you had any further opportunity to
install carpet for United Homes subsequently?

A. No.
Q. When this job was originally bid, was that
a possibility?
A. Very possible.

MR. HANSEN: I am going to object to that as
being speculative.
THE CouRT: The objection will be sustained.
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JYIR. MADSEN: I think it goes to the question of
possible future business and loss to him, your
Honor.

J\fR. HANSEN: Same objection.
THE CouRT: Objection sustained." (R-35 and
R-36.)
The only other reference to continued business with
United Homes got into the record obliquely from the
testimony of Claude Thompson as follows:
"A. Well, at that time we had taken quite a loss
on this Sorensen job, and these contract jobs you
take at a very close margin anyway, and even if
everything comes out as you planned, very often
you sustain a loss rather than a profit. And in
this case this United Homes were in the process
of building a great quantity of these apartment
houses around the country, and I gave my own
bill-''
At this point, counsel for plaintiff interrupted. (R-54
and R-55)
While the undersigned is aware that speculative
and unknown damages are not admissible in an action
for breach of contract, still, estimated future profits are
recoverable if, in fact, competent evidence is introduced
to provide a sufficient basis to show their certainty.
Hence, the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, paragraph 331, provides :
"(1) Damages are recoverable for losses caused
or for profits and other gains prevented by the
breach only to the extent that the evidence affords
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a sufficient basis for estimating their amount in
money with reasonable certainty."
In this vein is the following citation from 15 Am.
Jur., damages ~ 150:
"But it must be borne in mind that since porfits
are prospective they must, to some extent, be uncertain and problematical, and so, on that account
or on account of the difficulties in the way· of
proof, a person complaining of breach of contract
cannot be deprived of all remedy, and uncertainty
merely as to the amount of profits that would have
been made does not prevent a recovery. The law
does not require absolute certainty of data upon
which lost profits are to estimated, but all that is
required is such reasonable certainty that damages may not be based wholly upon speculation
and conjecture, and it is sufficient if there is a
certain standard or fixed method by which profits
sought to be recovered may be estimated and determined with a fair degree of accuracy. It has
been said that the most definite rule that can be
drawn from the cases would seem to be that if
by any chance or under any condition of affairs
then existing the profits might not have accrued
though the wrongful act had not intervened, there
can be no allowance of profits lost as damages ;
but if, except for the wrongful act, there must
have been profits notwithstanding any other circumstances existing at the time of the perpetration of the wrong, the question of their speculativeneess and contingency is absolutely negatived.
It is usually the right of the innocent party to
prove the nature of his contract, the circumstances
surrounding and following its breach, and the
consequences naturally and plainly traceable to
it, and then it is for the jury, under proper instructions as to the rules of damages, to deter15

mine the compensation to be awarded for the
breach.''
Cited by way of footnote to the above paragraph is
the case of Anvil Mining Company v. Humble, 153 U. S.
540, 38 L. Ed. 814, 14 S. Ct. 876, and an L.R.A. Annotation,
1915 B, 114. Refusal to permit any such evidence as requested in the proffer above noted, defendant-appellant
maintains, was error and unduly restricted defendant i11
attempting to show its losses resulting directly and proximately from G. & P.'s conduct.
(B) THE JUDGMENT DID NOT CONFORM
TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED.

Defendant-appellant maintains that the controlling
law in this fact situation was enunciated by this court
in the case of J. Seal v. Carpets, Incorporated, 13 Utah
2nd 147, 369 Pac. 2nd 493 (1162). The cited case involved
the same two parties presently before the court today but
arose out of a different fact situation; however, it still
bears some striking similarities to those before the court
in this action. In the cited case, plaintiff was suing on
an open account for an out-of-state assignor, which assignor was in the carpet wholesaling business. Such are
the facts here.
Further in the cited case there was a third party
importer also involved, which is not the case here; and
there was a fourth party, Factor-Collection Agency, not
present here. There are two other major distinctions
between the facts of the former case and those present
16

here. They are: In the cited case, plaintiff-assignor's
sales agent inspected the installation of the carpet in defendant's customers' homes and gave direct repeated
assurances to defendant that such defective carpet would
be replaced or that defendant would be indemnified therefor. In the facts before the bar, plaintiff's assignor's
agent made only one inspection of the United Homes installation, the day before the trial, and insisted that the
carpeting was not defective. Also, in the cited case defendant had actually incurred expenditures for replacement of defective carpet, while in the case at bar, he
gave only testimony as to what is anticipated will be
necessary to expend to replace the defective carpeting.
In all other material particulars, the cases are congruent.
The opinion of this court, written by Justice Henriod
reads:
''There appears ample, sufficient, substantial,
competent and believable evidence, viewed favorably for defendant, to support the trial court's
conclusion.''
The second memorandum decision of Judge Hanson,
<lated February 19, 1965, in which defendant's motions
to amend and ask for a new trial were denied, reads in
part as follows :
''The court, after viewing the premises, was of
the opinion that any lay person, by examining
the rugs in question, could determine that the
rug in the easterly portion of the buildings was
not the same type or quality of the rugs in the
other buildings.''
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It added:
"The rug in the easterly apartment, which had
been referred to as "pilling," was not of the same
quality as the other rugs, and the Court had no
way of adjusting between the parties the difference between the value thereof, and thus afforded
the defendant an offset in the sum of $1,625.00,
which was the amount that defendant claimed it
lost on the contract ~with defendant's purchasers."
(R-136 and R-137) (Emphasis added)
This restrictive holding, defendant contends, was error,
since there was competent and unimpeached evidence
before the court from which he could and should haw
''adjusted between the parties the difference between
the value thereof." It was the testimony of l\fr. Claude
Thompson as follows:

"Q. And have efforts been made by you to re-

solve the matter in terms of replacement of carpeting?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you have any estimate at this time as
to how much in the way of replacement is going
to be needed?
A. I would say 50 per cent of the units, or better.
Q. And do you have any estimate as to what the
cost of replacement is going to be, in terms of
understanding there are 2,200 yards on the job.
Half of that would be 1,100 yards. At what minimum yard cost, your cost, would such a replacement run in dollars and cents?
A. Well, just something - even on the same basis
as this, my cost would be in the neighborhood of
five or six thousand dollars. I did ascertain some
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of the labor involved in renewing and replacing
new carpet.
Q. Replacing the comparable quality?

A. Even the comparable quality of this would be
at least that much." (R-60)
Cost of replacement of such carpeting forms a
legitimate and competent element of damage, and
evidence in that connection, was admitted as above
noted. Such evidence, though it was an estimate, was
not impeached and not contradicted. The current law
in this area is well-enunciated in the case of Hoenstine v.
Rose, 131 Montana 557, 312 Pac. 2nd 514, 517 (1957).
That action was one for recovery for damages to a vehicle where the vehicle in question had not, in fact, been
repaired at the time of trial. The Montana Supreme
Court there said :

"It is not a condition precedent to recovery for
items of damage necesesary to put plaintiff's
wrecked vehicle in the condition it was before the
accident that plaintiff should have first incurred
an indebtedneess therefor or that he should have
actually expended or paid the sum claimed in
replacing or repairing the damaged parts. Chambers v. Cunningham, 153 Okl. 129, 5 P. 2d 378,
78 A. L. R. 905; Kincaid v. Dunn, 26 Cal. App.
686, 148 P. 235, 236; Menefee v. Raisch Improvement Co., 78 Cal. App. 785, 248 P. 1031, 1032; J. J.
Clarke Co. v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., La. App.
1945, 22 So. 2d 298, 300; Newman v. Brown, 228
S. C. 472, 90 S.E. 2d 649, 635."
Of similar import in a related area of medical bills
as an element of damage, whether or not the same are

paid, was ruled on m the California case of Broicn v.
Guarantee Insurance Company, 155 Cal. App. 2d 679,
319 Pac. 2d 69, 66 A. L. R. 2d 1202 (1958). There the
court quoted a -Wisconsin case of Schwartz v. N orwicli
Union Indemnity Company, 212 Wisc. 593, 250 North
West 446.
"The court reasoned as follows (250NW at page
446) : 'One who has been subjected to a judgment
by reason of fraud practiced upon him by another standing in the relation of insurer is entitled
to relief even though he has not paid the judgment. A cause of action in his favor arises and
his damage occurs when the liability becomes
thus fixed. Neither the right of action nor the
maesure of damages depends upon the fact of
payment.''
The record discloses considerable testimony of Mr.
Claude Thompson as to specific defects in the merchandise in the follo-wing testimony received both on direct
and cross-examination.

"Q. Have you had occasion to examine these two

exhibits, "D-2" and "D-3"?
A. Yes, I have.

Q. And would you be able to distinguish any differences between the two?
A. Yes, I would.

Q. What would the difference be?
A. I would say one would be about one-third lighter than the other.
THE CouRT: Let's say then, a difference, one
will be of, say, yardage?
20

Q. (By MR. MADSEN) That is "D-2."

A. '' D-2'' would feel to me about a third heavier
than this one, which is '' D-3. ''
Q. Any other distinguishing differences between

the two1
A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is that¥

A. '' D-2 '' has a double scrim back on it, which is
an advantage to a piece of carpet.
Q. Have you heard, are you familiar with the
phrase, what they call the ''Sunday sample?''
A. Yes, I have.
Q. What does that generically mean in the
industry1
A. A ''Sunday sample'' is ref erred to in the industry as a mill representative coming to you
with a heavier sample, a fine piece of carpeting,
and when you get the roll it is much lighter than
represented.
Q. Would you characterize the samples of the

carpets that went into the United Homes, the rolls
that went into United Homes, as opposed to the
samples, as originally furnished, as that category?
MR. HANSEN : Just a minute.
ished your question?

Have you fin-

MR. MADSEN : Yes.
MR. HANSEN: We will object to it as self-serving, calling for a conclusion, and not the best
evidence.
MR. MADSEN: We have qualified him. It does
call for a conclusion, your Honor.

21

--1\fR. HANSEN: Object further on the grounds
no proper fundation has been laid for opinion
evidence.
Q. (By 1\iR. MADSEN) 1\lr. Thompson, how long
have you been in the carpeting business?
A. Thirty-two years.
Q. Have you had occasion to examine samples furnished you hy mill representatives?
A. Thousands of them.
Q. And rolls of carpets subsequently furnished!
A. Thousands of them.
Q. Haye you had occasion to examine the samples
furnished your company by G. & P. Sales?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have occasion to examine rolls of carpet subsequently furnished to you by G. & P.
Sales?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have an opunon regarding the representative quality of the samples as compared to
the rolls of carpet furnished? You can answer
that question ''Yes,'' or ''No.''
A. Yes.
Q. What is that opinion?
A. That the rolls were not anywhere representative of the samples that were supplied us by G. &
P. Sales.
Q. Is that what is generally called in the trade a
"Sunday sample?"
A. Yes." (R-56-R-58)

By way of explanation, it had previously been established through the witness -William Thompson that Ex-
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hibit D-2 was a piece of carpet from the earlier rolls supplied and Exhibit D-3 was a piece of carpet from the later
rolls of carpet supplied by G. & P. (R-25)
On cross-examination:

"Q. Let's go to Exhibit "D-3." Is it your testimony "D-3" is defective?
A. Yes, sir. Any time, Mister, you can take a
piece of carpet and do this to it, it is not very good
(in di ca ting).
Q. Tell me now what you mean by "D-3" as being
defective.
A. Being thinner than it was assured it would be,
in construction. That it was not proper. There
were voids and lines through it that should not
have been there. They are still there, and you can
see for yourself, Sir, if you don't believe me.''
R-67)

And further:

'' Q. You mentioned this was a defective carpet

that we have here, ''Exhibit D-3.'' Would you
tell us again, were the defects right in this particular carpet?
A. In this particular carpet?
Q. Yes.

A. I could probably show you. There is a couple
right through the woof.
Q. Isn't that a result of something being torn out
of it thougM
A. I don't know. It is what happens that indicates that it isn't put together very well, that type
of broadloom.
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Q. That is -vvithout the scrim 1
A. It hasn't scrim, but it has rubber or latex that
is supposed to hold it together." (R-74-R-75)

The witness also, at some length, pointed out the
difficulties and waste encountered by the odd-sized rolls
of carpet received, by reason of the varying sized rolls
furnished by G. & P. as follows:
'' Q. You have testified, I believe, on the original
direct. Well, excuse me. Let me strike that. I
wanted to ask, you heard the testimony of your
son relating to the size of the various rolls from
being as high as 100 yards and from 30 yards. Is
there any distinction about large rolls and small
rolls in a job like this?
A. Yes, indeed there is.
Q. What is that.
A. \:Vhere here we are laying a lot of rooms, in
that case, carpet, the larger the roll the bigger the
advantage. It requires lesser seams, fewer seams,
and we can plan the cuts of the roll of carpet with
literally not any waste. If rolls come in small, we
accept a roll of 30 and 40 feet as a small roll, a
partial roll. There is so much loss in laying a
room, or any series of rooms.
Q. What kind of cuts-

1\fR. HANSEN: I am going to object to this as
being irrelevant to the issues of this case. There
is no claim it wasn't properly cut, and that seems
to be what hisMR. MADSEN: We are getting around to the
word "defective," and what our Pretrial Order is
meant to cover. We indicate a loss. I presume,
therefore, the manner in which it was produced
and delivered, I presume the amounts in which
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it was finished, I presume the caliber of each roll
as it was produced is relevant or material.
THE CouRT: I can see where some of this business about the rolls might be proper, because
everybody knows if rolls are coming from one
plant or from another plant there might be a
little variation in color.
MR. MADSEN : Exactly, your Honorj and I think
that is within the issues of this case as we have
tried to define them.
THE CouRT : Go ahead.
Q. (By MR. MADSEN) Would you indicate what
that occasions, therefore, when the rolls are
shorter~

A. May I elaborate just a little bit on this?
Q. Would you please? That is what I am asking.

A. What this matter considered, to delegate the
jobs to our installers, a job to oversee the cutting
and the installation, and when we lay - when we
come and lay out a job, if we were doing this room
we would want as few seams in a broadloom roll
as possible to make, and if we take a roll 30 feet
long and this room would be 27 feet, and the least
cut to fill out would not match that roll, dye-lotwise, there is a tremendous amount of waste.
Q. Tell me, what do you mean by "dye-lot?"
A. If we ordered this very patch today it would
be ten shades off, your order. If it comes out the
same shade, the amount of yarn, it is the same
color, or if it doesn't it varies.
Q. It varies?
A. Unless it is the same dyelot it varies in color
detail.
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Q. When you have a number of small rolls as
opposed to large rolls, the resulting matchA. Yes, sir.

Q. .May cause waste?

A. It is difficult-" (R-83-R-84)
In view of the fact that complaints on this carpet
were timely conveyed, according to defendant's eYidence, as early as December, 1962, (R-78-R-79) and acknowledged by Witherell as having been received at lea~t
by August 22, 1963 (R-98-R-99); and, in further view of
the fact that plaintiff's assignor had been unwilling to
admit any liability or defectiveness, notwithstanding
his own expert witness admitting that the pilling observed was a defect (R-128), the defendant-appellant
should not be precluded from an off set solely for the reason that it has not expended the estimated funds on replacement carpet herein.
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CONCLUSION
In all other particulars, the Facts and the Law of the
J. Seal v. Carpets, Incorporated case cited above are
controlling here. The defendant should be entitled to an
offset which, under the evidence, far exceeds plaintiff's
claim. The ruling of the trial court should accordingly
be reversed with instructions that plaintiff's complaint
be dismissed, no cause of action. In the alternative, the
case should be remanded with the instructions that the
court conduct a new trial allowing defendant to introduce evidence not admitted as noted under point A above.
Respectfully submitted,
GORDON A. MADSEN
MABEY,RONNOW,MADSEN
& MARSDEN
57 4 East Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for DefendantA ppellant
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